An area that changes through the barrel of a gun

The Middle East has long been regarded as the graveyard of grand theories of international relations. At the same time, however, it remains a crucial region for their study—not only due to its concentrations of complex issues and phenomena but also because its geopolitical importance makes it a key indicator of global power shifts. It was in the Middle East that the first major non-state challenge to American hegemony emerged in the form of radical Islamism. Likewise, it was in the Middle East that the first signs of America’s declining power became evident. The emergence of the “war on terror” as a central strategic focus, along with involvement in yet another “endless war” in Afghanistan, not only drained vast resources but also inflicted lasting damage on American prestige. At the same time, the Middle East continues to reflect shifts in global and regional power balances.

While numerous indicators could be used to track these trends, none signal instability and political transition on an international level as clearly as military armament. The data and analyses of the dossier “The Armories of the Middle East” paint a picture that is anything but peaceful or reassuring. A complex web of actors—states, smugglers, and rebels—are engaged in the trafficking, sale, and development of all types of weaponry, from small arms to nuclear-capable missiles. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in the region has more than doubled over the past two decades, rising from $91.39 billion in 2003 to $200.43 billion in 2023. The bulk of this expenditure goes toward arms imports, which, despite annual fluctuations, have followed an upward trajectory over the last decade. Equally significant is the role of domestic military industries, with Turkey and Israel emerging as major arms manufacturers and exporters.

Yet conventional weapons are only part of the issue. The region exists under the shadow of a potential nuclear domino effect. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are well known. Occasional estimates—sometimes down to the exact day—of when Iran might acquire nuclear weapons may be met with smirks, but it is clear that Iran views them as the ultimate deterrent, especially in the wake of Syria’s collapse, Hezbollah’s weakening, and escalating threats from Israel and the U.S. However, Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is not just a blow to the principle of non-proliferation. It would add yet another nuclear power to the region, alongside Israel, which does not officially acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons. Some nuclear deterrence theorists might even argue that it could foster greater stability, as the threat of nuclear destruction would encourage more restraint. But the greatest threat to the region may lie in the possibility of triggering a nuclear arms race involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others, ultimately leading to uncontrolled nuclear proliferation and exponentially increasing the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation.

This risk becomes even greater when we factor in actors beyond the state. Discussions about the renewed confrontation between major powers often overshadow the role of non-state actors in the region, yet the possibility cannot be ruled out that some may seek to use “dirty bombs” enhanced with radioactive material. And while the use of nuclear weapons by armed non-state groups may seem like a remote scenario, conventional weapons continue to reach them unhindered.

The following articles trace the intricate routes of arms shipments—routes that could rival the most elaborate spy thrillers. Ghost companies, CEOs with multiple identities, and a fleet of aircraft and ships that quite literally fly under the radar of authorities form a complex network, making it nearly impossible to track the origin and destination of these weapons with certainty. At the same time, non-state armed actors in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and beyond remain key players in regional violence, as vividly illustrated in the accompanying graphs. These actors obtain weapons from allied countries in the context of proxy wars, but also from enemy (state) forces— either by seizing arms abandoned during retreats or through corrupt military personnel who, amid low morale, divert them for personal gain. The rapid collapse of the Assad regime and the swift takeover of Aleppo and Damascus serve as prime examples of both dynamics at play. While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Julani (now Ahmed al-Sharaa), seek international recognition, the Houthis not only control much of northern Yemen’s state apparatus but also exhibit all the characteristics of a functioning state—except formal recognition. They even display a remarkable ability to project power regionally, striking targets far beyond their immediate rivals in Yemen and effectively “regulating” global trade flows through attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea. To achieve this, they have built a complex network of arms flows that, beyond the usual suspect—Iran—also involves neighbouring countries like Somalia. Simultaneously, the Houthis have developed the capability to manufacture their own weapons, proving that military innovation is no longer limited to states with advanced military industries.

We are now in an era of “technological democratisation,” where non-state actors can access high-tech weaponry once reserved for states. In short, there is no doubt that the Middle East remains in turmoil. The following articles examine this reality through the lens of armed violence and the weapons that fuel it. The task of mapping the flows and the parties involved is extremely challenging, yet essential. It offers a fragmented but revealing view of what is happening in the region—one that goes beyond general analyses and wishful thinking, grounded instead in evidence and thorough documentation. In this sense, the dossier “The Armories of the Middle East” is an indispensable “guide” for understanding both the present and future of the Middle East.

Translation: Anatoli Stavroulopoulou

Read all articles and analyses of the Special Report: “Armories of the Middle East” here.

This article was first published on Feb. 22 by the weekend edition of the newspaper “TA NEA”.